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L E T T E R

FROM THE HONOURABLE

L—t G—I B—GH,


TO THE

Rt. Hon. W—M P—T, Esq;

S E—Y of S—T E.

Together with

His M—y's Instructions for the late Expeditions on the Coast of *France*.



L O N D O N :

Printed for T. PAYNE, the Corner of the *Mews-Gate*, in
Castle-Street, St. Martin's-Lane. 1758.

[Price One Shilling.]

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Letter was wrote to
the Right Honourable W——m
P—t, Esq; Se—t—y of S—te, and was
returned the same Day. Some few Alte-
rations have been made to render it less
exceptionable.

S E C R E T
I N S T R U C T I O N S
F O R
Lieut. Gen. B L I G H.

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS *for our*
trusty and well beloved Thomas
Bligh, Esq. Lieutenant General of
our Forces, whom we have appoint-
ed General and Commander in Chief
of all and singular our Troops and
Land-Forces, appointed or to be ap-
pointed for a Secret Expedition for
our Service; or for such other Offi-
cer, on whom the Command in
Chief of our said Troops and Land-
Forces may devolve. Given at our
Court at Kensington the Eighteenth
Day of July, 1758, in the Thirty-
Second Year of our Reign.

HAVING by our Commission,
bearing Date the Thirteenth Day
of this Instant, appointed you to be Ge-
A neral

neral and Commander in Chief of all and singular our Forces appointed, or to be appointed for a Secret Expedition; for your better Discharge of the great and important Trust thereby reposed in you, we have judged it proper to give you the following Instructions.

I. You shall, immediately upon the Receipt of these our Instructions, repair to the Isle of *Wight*, where we have appointed Ships to convey you, and the Forces under your Command, to the Coast of *France*; and so soon as the said Forces shall be embarked, you shall accordingly proceed without Loss of Time, under Convoy of such of our Ships of War as shall be judged proper for that Purpose. And our trusty and well-beloved *Richard Howe*, Esq; whom we have appointed Commander in Chief of our said Ships, is instructed to co-operate with you, and to be aiding and assisting in all such Enterprizes,

terprizes, as, by these our Instructions, you shall be directed to undertake, for our Service.

II. Whereas we have determined, with the Blessing of God, to prosecute the just War, in which we are engaged against the *French* King, with the utmost Vigour; and it being highly expedient, and of the greatest Utility, to continue some Expedition, that may cause a Diversion, and engage the Enemy to employ, in their own Defence, a considerable Part of their Forces, destined to invade and oppress the Liberties of the Empire, and to subvert the Independency of *Europe*; and, if possible, to make some effectual Impression on the Enemy, which, by disturbing and shaking the Credit of their public Loans, and at the same Time securing and protecting the Commerce of our own Subjects, by striking at the

principal Seats of their Privateers, as well as by disconcerting, and in Part frustrating, their dangerous and extensive Operations of War, may reflect Lustre on our Arms, and add Life and Strength to the common Cause : Our Will and Pleasure is, that you do exert your utmost Endeavours to land, if it shall be found practicable, with the Troops under your Command, at or near *Cherburg*, on the Coast of *Normandy*, and to attack the Batteries, Forts and Town of *Cherburg* ; and in case, by the Blessing of God upon our Arms, the said Place shall be carried, and that our Troops shall be able to maintain themselves there, a competent Time, for demolishing and destroying the Port and Basen, together with all the Ships, Naval Stores and Works, Batteries, Fortifications, Arsenals, and Magazines, thereunto belonging, you are to use all possible Means, effectually to demolish and destroy the same ;

same ; and you are also to exert such other Efforts, as you shall judge most proper, to annoy and distress the Enemy. — When this Service shall be compleated, or in Case the Attack abovementioned on *Ckerburg* shall not succeed, our Will and Pleasure is, that you do proceed to carry a warm Alarm along the Coast of *France*, and to make Descents upon any Part, or Parts thereof ; and attack any Place, that may be found practicable, from the Eastermost Point of *Normandy*, as far Westward as *Morlaix*, inclusive ; and you are to carry into Execution all, or any of the above Operations, in such Order of Time, as from the Circumstances of the Wind and Weather, shall be most advisable, and most conducive to our Service ; and whereas the Diversion hereby proposed to be made, is of the highest Importance to the Good of the common Cause, our Will and Pleasure is, that you do continue
with

with as much Vigour, and give as much Duration to the various Operations of the present Expedition, as shall be found practicable, and consistent with the Good of our Service, as well from the Strength and tenable Nature of any Place or Post, whereof you may become Master, as from the Force, which the Enemy shall collect in those Parts, to oppose you, and from the Circumstances and Situation of our Troops and Ships; during which Time, you are to exert all such Efforts for annoying the Enemy, as you shall judge proper; and you are in all Cases, to preserve, with the utmost Attention and Circumspection, the Communication with our Ships.

III. Whereas the Success of this Expedition will very much depend upon an intire good Understanding between our Land and Sea Officers; we do hereby strictly enjoin and require you, on your
Part

Part, to maintain and cultivate such a good Understanding and Agreement ; and to order, that the Soldiers under your Command, should man the Ships, when there shall be Occasion for them, and when they can be spared from the Land Service ; as the Commander in Chief of our Squadron is instructed on his Part, to entertain and cultivate the same good Understanding and Agreement, and to order the Sailors and Marines, under his Command, to assist our Land Forces, and to man the Batteries, when there shall be occasion for them, and when they can be spared from the Sea Service ; and in order to establish the strictest Union that may be, between you, and the Commander in Chief of our Ships, you are hereby required to communicate these Instructions to him, and he will be directed to communicate those, he shall receive, to you.

IV. You shall, from time to time, and as you shall have Opportunity, send constant Accounts of your Proceedings, in the Execution of these our Instructions, to one of our principal Secretaries of State; from whom you will receive such further Orders and Instructions as we may think proper to give you.

V. In case the Circumstances of our Troops under your Command, or any urgent Necessity, should require your leaving the Coasts of *France*, before you can receive our Orders for that Purpose; you are, in case of such Necessity, to return to *England*, and land the Troops at such of our Ports, as shall be most convenient.





A

LETTER

FROM THE HONOURABLE

Lt. G — l B — GH, &c.

SIR,

Y^{OU} thought it proper, that I
should give in a more particular
Account of the last Landing up-
on the Coast of *France*.

I comply with your Request, and shall
put down every Thing in the View it
appeared to me.

B

If

If any Person intends to form a just Judgment of the whole, he must have his Majesty's Instructions to me before his Eyes; and with an honest candid Heart, consider their Spirit, Meaning, and Intention, without cavilling upon them like a petty-fogging Attorney.

The only Place pointed out in them, is *Cherbourg*. I shall say little upon that Enterptize. That Harbour, of the utmost Importance, from its Situation, as to the Distressing of our Country, on which, though not finished, above a Million *English* has been expended, was destroyed, with the Shipping we found there; though it was imagined, by the *French*, impracticable, upon Account of their Forts and Batteries; with about 150 Pieces of Cannon erected, as they thought, at every Place we could land, and guarded by four Battalions of Foot, three Squadrons of Dragoons, and three thousand *Garde des Cotes*,

It appeared to me, that the greatest Part of their Precautions could be rendered useless ; and for that Reason, we landed about eight Miles from the Town, where there was still three Battalions and three Squadrons to oppose our first Landing, and marched up to the Place, without paying any Regard to the Forts, which must fall of Course.

Afterwards a Body of Troops, superior to ours in Number, under the Command of a Marshal of *France*, was assembled within a few Hours March of us: Yet I continued there, though we must have been abandoned by the Fleet, in Case of a North-west Wind blowing hard, till what was ordered to be done in my Instructions was executed.

This is the first Enterprize upon the Coast of *France*, for several Centuries past, which has done Honour to our Country, and brought Disgrace upon the *French*.

This Enterprize being finished, though there was no other Place mentioned in my Instructions, I thought it my Duty, without pleading Want of Information or Intelligence, which I might very justly have done, to undertake any Thing, that might turn out to the Advantage of my Country : Though I was thoroughly sensible of the Treatment I had Reason to expect, in Case of the least adverse Fortune ; and that I must be given up, in Case of any Clamour, having no Parliamentary Interest or Connections to procure me the Appearances of Candour, or to render it necessary to treat me with any Degree of Caution. Contrary to my Expectations, indeed, I have met with this Treatment, though I have not had the Misfortune to suffer what I reckon the smallest Check.

After considering my Instructions, I found that one principal View, in sending out this Armament, was to make a Diversion of the Enemy's Forces ; to continue a warm Alarm along the Coast of
France,

France, and to make Descents on any Part, from the Eastermost Point of *Normandy*, as far Westward as *Morlaix* inclusive.

Uninformed as I was from my Instructions, or from any Body before I left *London*, and unprovided with Intelligence, as I went upon the Expedition only three Days after I came from *Ireland*, from whence his Majesty was pleased to call me, to command his Troops going into *Germany*: I had no other Means to direct my Conduct, than such Reasonings as I could form of myself, and such Informations as I could pick up at Sea, or in my last Descent.

After *Cherbourg* was taken, there was no longer a Necessity for any of the Enemy's Troops to guard the *Peninsula*, and the *French* Army of Ten Thousand Men that was assembled, and destined for the Protection of *Normandy*, was likely to fall down towards *Granville*; from whence they could easily move
over

over to *Caen*, and the other Parts of that Coast, so as to render an Attempt almost impracticable.

This was likewise confirmed to me, by Intelligence we afterwards received, which gave Account that they had already made every Preparation for the Defence of *Granville*, by sinking several Ships in the Mouth of the Harbour, and by raising several new Redoubts and Fortifications in proper Places.

By the Intelligence given me by the Ministry, there was a considerable Force stationed at *Brest*; and I had been told in particular, that it would be scarce proper to make any Descent so far Westward as *Morlaix*, lest I should be overpowered by Numbers quartered in *Brest*, and the Neighbourhood.

These two Circumstances seemed to reduce the Part of the Coast, which I could attempt, to a narrow Compass: I endeavoured to learn the Situation of the
inter-

intermediate Country, to which I was thus confined; from the Intelligence in which Lord *Howe* placed the greatest Confidence, I understood, that in Time of Peace there had often been at *St. Briac*, a Place within a Mile of *St. Lunaire*, three hundred Vessels, tho' of no great Burden.

We landed therefore at *St. Lunaire*, the 4th of *September*, but did not find at *St. Briac*, above twenty Vessels, which were destroyed, as well as some Batteries upon that Coast.

But this Service was not the only Point I had in view. There was a further Design, if found practicable, against *St. Maloes*.

That Town, situated upon a Bank of Sand, almost surrounded by the Sea, has no Water but by an Aqueduct of Pipes, and tho' excessively populous, not above six hundred Yards long, and four hundred broad, the Inhabitants
being

being crowded together into a very narrow Compass.

We therefore imagined, if the Place could be invested, that by cutting the Pipes and bombarding the Town, it would be obliged to surrender.

Besides the Intelligence we received, we did not despair, in case of Necessity, of being able to open the Wall, and take the Place by Storm at Low Water.

But the Body of Troops being greatly diminished from what they were in the late Expedition, it was impossible to invest it with our Numbers on both Sides of the Rance. We could therefore only invest it on the West Side, by placing Ships at *St. Dinar*, which the Pilots, who were acquainted with the Coast, thought very practicable: But Lord *Howe* was of Opinion, that the Ships could not be placed, till all the Batteries on the West Side of the River at *St. Dinar*, &c. were destroyed, which our
Pilots

Pilots said they had seen at that Place, which was likewise confirmed by some People, who had observed them from *St. Servant*, when under the Command of the Duke of *Marlborough* and Lord *George Sackville*.

Thus the Landing at *St. Lunaire*, upon Account of burning the Ships at *St. Briac*, became a necessary Step on this Account likewise.

Having landed *September* the 4th, and burnt the Ships at *St. Briac*, we on the fifth reconnoitred the Point *St. Dinar*, and the whole Western Coast of the Rance, opposite to *St. Maloes*, and found that all the Cannon from the Batteries had been lately carried away.

There were but three Methods of moving from thence to the opposite Side to *Parame* and *St. Servant*.

The first which the Pilots imagined would be practicable, was moving the
C
flat

flat-bottom Boats in the Night, for that was necessary upon the Coast of a fortified Island, along the Shore by *St. Dinar*, up the River opposite to *Tour a Chaus*, a little above *St. Servant*, and there carrying the Troops over.

We found upon our Reconnoitring, that there was a *French* Man of War, with some other Vessels, near *Dinar* Point; it became therefore a necessary Step to employ one Night in destroying these, before the other could be put in Execution.

This Circumstance occasioned Delays, and encreased the Difficulties, which, independent of this, we found to be very great; so that it appeared we could scarcely proceed by this Method with a Probability of Success.

The other two Methods were either going round by *Dinant*, about eighteen Miles from the Shore, and landing the Artillery, &c. near *Paramé*; or embarking

embarking the whole Troops at *St. Lu-
naire*, and dissembarking them again
near *Paramé*, along with the Artillery.

Which ever of these Measures had
been taken, the Men of War were to
have anchored, so as to cut off the Com-
munication with *Dinar* and the Western
Coast.

But independent of all other Circum-
stances, as I had the Honour to acquaint
you in my Letter from thence, the
Weather made the Design impracti-
cable.

The first Day we with Difficulty
brought ashore sixty Light Horse, and
two Field Pieces; nor could we bring
any more for the succeeding Days.

Delays in an Operation of this Kind,
upon the Coast of *France*, are of the
utmost Consequence, and may disap-
point an Enterprize, in which it might
have been otherwise impossible to fail.

It appeared to me, that if the Weather had been favourable, we had the greatest Reason, which any military Enterprize can admit of, to expect Success.

On the Sixth of *September*, the Day after we had reconnoitered *Dinar*, &c. Lord *Howe* declared, that the Weather was so unsettled, and the Sea so rough, that it was extremely dangerous for the Fleet to remain upon that Part of the Coast, where we could with the utmost Difficulty land our Provisions, or even send a Boat with a Message to the Fleet.

His Lordship, after he had considered the Situation of the whole Coast to the West, thought it necessary for the Fleet to go to *St. Cas* Bay, on Account of Safety, and for the Troops to march to that Part; where, if I found it expedient by remaining sometime a shore at *Matignon*, about a League from *St. Cas*, I might create a Diversion, alarm the Country, and contribute, perhaps, by this Means,
to

to the recalling of Troops from Germany.

It was upon this Account, a Part of my Instructions, that I should continue with as much Vigour, and give as much Durations to the various Operations of the present Expedition, as shall be found practicable.

September Seventh. I ordered Colonel *Clerk*, Quarter-master General, with two hundred Grenadiers under his Command, to reconnoitre Part of the next Day's March. He proceeded with his Party to the Convent of *St. Guildos*, on the Eastern Side of the River *Equernon*, and returned to Camp that Night, after marching eighteen Miles.

I likewise gave Directions about a proper Quantity of Provisions being landed, which was with Difficulty brought ashore within the Day,

September

September Eighth. The Army decamped, and on its March passed the *Drouette*, which can only be done at Low Water. When the Army arrived at the River *Equernon*, we encamped on the Eastern Side, for we could not pass it that Night on Account of the Tide; and it would have been dangerous to have done it next Day by the Morning's Ebb, as the Troops for that Purpose must have been put in Motion in the Night, and begun the Passage before Day-light.

The River is only passable for about two Hours at Low-Water, and the Ford is sometimes dangerous on Account of Quick-sands. The Peasants were firing from the Houses of *St. Guildo* on the opposite Side, and made a Show to dispute the Passage.

For these Reasons we passed the River at Low Water, in the Afternoon, on the Ninth of *September*. The Peasants fired from the Houses upon the Troops beginning to pass, and wounded Captain

John

Johns in the Foot, and Lord *Frederic Cavendish* slightly, and a few private Men.

Some of the Soldiers lost their Firelocks in the Water, and were almost drowned, having escaped narrowly by being hauled out with Tent-poles.

The Enemy had posted some regular Foot to guard the Passage of the River at the Bridge of *Plancourt*, about four Miles above the Ford, which moved off upon our having crossed below.

When the Army had passed the River it was almost Sun-set, so I thought it improper to advance in the Night in a Country we had not reconnoitred, especially as we had no certain Information of the State of the Enemy's Troops. We encamped therefore that Night to the Westward, with the River a little Way in our Rear.

The

The Tenth, in the Morning, we march-
ed to *Matignon*. I ordered the Quarter-
master General, with three hundred Gre-
nadiers under his Command, to advance
about an Hour before the Army.

He met, about two Miles from the
Camp, a Party of *French* Dragoons and
some regular Foot, who kept at the Di-
stance of a hundred and fifty Yards, mov-
ing off gradually, as he advanced, with-
out any Firing upon either Side.

They drew up in the Inclosures round
Matignon: But, upon his forming up the
Grenadiers, and sending some Parties up-
on their Flanks, they immediately re-
tired.

The Army came up to *Matignon*
about One o'Clock, we saw nothing but
some small parties of *French*, that at-
tempted to harraß our Flanks; one of
which advancing too far, made a Signal
to surrender, but one of our flanking
Parties

Parties not perceiving it, fired and killed the Officer with some of the Men.

We encamped with our Left to the Town, all the Army having passed through it, except the Grenadier Companies, who remained and covered it on the other Side.

I immediately sent the second Regiment of Guards to *St. Cas*, as my Intention was, that Provisions, particularly Bread, should be brought up without loss of Time, in case I should find it convenient to stay in that Camp, or proper to advance up the Country.

I likewise sent Colonel *Cunningham*, Chief Engineer, in case I should think it proper to retreat, to reconnoitre the Beach, and see what was proper to be done.

Several Deserters came in this Evening. By them, and some Prisoners we had taken, we were informed that several

D

Regiments

Regiments had marched from different Parts of the Province, even from *Brest* and its Neighbourhood, and that their Camp was at present within two Leagues of us.

I consulted with all the General Officers, who were unanimously of Opinion, that it was proper to march the next Day, and embark the Troops.

I saw nobody, neither then, nor even afterwards, when aboard the Ships, who was of a different Opinion, except Lieutenant Colonel *Clerk*, the Quarter-Master-General, whose Advice it was, to disembark the rest of the Light Horse, and Field Pieces, and advance to attack the Enemy.

The *French* Army was by our Accounts equal, and supposing their Battalions compleat, superior to ours, with three Squadrons of Horse, and twenty-two Pieces of Cannon.

By

By that Time the Enemy must be supposed to know exactly the Number of our Troops upon the Coast, and by their marching Regiments from *Brest*, they shewed they feared no Attack from Lord *Anson's* Fleet.

It was therefore to be expected, that their Army would be quickly reinforced by the Garrisons of other Towns, especially that of *St. Maloes*, which had not as yet joined them.

It was besides always in the *French* General's Power, either to give us Battle, or to retire, till such Time as he could be sure of over-powering us by Numbers, or at least making our Retreat extremely difficult.

The Endeavouring to embark at *St. Brieu*, or some other Place along the Coast, a Design which I wished much to put in Execution, appeared to me very hazardous on Account of the Weather, which, at that Time of the Year, must

grow every Day more and more uncertain.

These Reasons, with the Opinion of the General Officers, determined me to send my Aid de Camp that Night to Lord *Howe*, to inform him of my Intention to march the next Morning and embark the Troops, as soon as the proper Naval Preparations could be made for that Purpose.

This Night a Party of the Enemy alarmed the Piquets ; but after receiving the Fire of one of our advanced Posts, and their firing a few Shot, they retired.

The Eleventh of *September*. Having ordered the Generale to beat before Daylight, the Army marched off the Ground by Break of Day in one Column ; for our little Army made but a small Column, consisting then but of eleven Battalions, about six thousand five hundred Men, capable of being quickly formed before any Attack could be made, and the Battalions

talions arrived faster at the Beach, than it was possible for them to embark. The rear Guard, consisting of the Grenadiers, exchanged some Shot with the advanced Parties of the Enemy.

We began to embark at Nine upon the Beach of *St. Cas*; when about four Battalions had been aboard, we perceived the advanced Parties of the *French* Army appearing upon the high Grounds. We continued embarking the Troops, and the *French* forming out, by Degrees, through some Inclosures, and firing at us with some Field-pieces, which we returned very sharply from the Frigates and Bomb-ketches, which were brought in by my Lord *Howe* to cover the Embarkation.

After the Generals *Moyston*, *Boscawen* and *Elliot* were on Board the Ships with their several Brigades, and after the greatest Part of General *Dury*'s Brigade, which was the last Brigade, had been embarked, I went on Board with those whose Duty it was to attend me, there being no other
Troops.

Troops then on Shore but the Rear-Guard, composed of the Grenadiers commanded by Colonel *Griffin*. My Anxiety for the Troops made me stay, perhaps, longer than I ought, and contrary to my Duty.

Some Parties of the Enemy moved down from the high Grounds on the Right, and General *Dury* went with three Companies of the first Regiment, which was all of his Brigade that was at that Time on Shore, to the Assistance of the Rear-Guard.

The Beach was about three Quarters of a Mile long, with a Sand-bank in Front, almost as advantageous for us, in many Places, as for the Enemy ; though they had formerly a bad Kind of a Parapet made to prevent our landing in that Bay, which was but imperfectly destroyed.

Whilst our Troops were covered by this Sand-bank, the Frigates fired with great Facility over them upon the Enemy:

So

So that if Artillery had been brought ashore, in all Probability it would have been lost; and could have been of no Service, but by obstructing a much greater Fire.

Some of our Companies of Grenadiers moved up to the Top of this Bank, and fired upon some of the Enemy, who were coming down and forming from the Heights, which killed a great many of them, and threw them into Confusion: But fresh Troops of the Enemy advancing, they retired to the Shore.

The Rear-Guard, the three Companies of the first Regiment included, consisted of about fourteen hundred Men, of whom were missing about seven hundred, and of those, between four and five hundred were Prisoners.

The Number of killed and wounded among the Enemy, according to their own most moderate Accounts, was more than double that of ours.

I have

I have described the whole Affair. Every Operation in War must appear to different Men in very different Views, even to Men of Capacity, Abilities, and Experience. The greatest Part of Mankind, the Military not excepted, judge without Reflection, and from trifling little Views and Circumstances, which either are of no Consequence, or which must often happen, in every Operation, by the very Nature of War.

However, I am convinced in the present Case, that the real Cause, and first Spring of many Peoples Reflections on my Conduct, is my Success at *Cherbourg*; such is the present melancholy Situation of our Country. If I had acted the Part of an ignorant Coward, and dishonest Man, I should have found Friends and Protection where I found none.

Yet I am very far from imagining, that I have not committed Faults and Errors. The greatest Generals in all Ages, to whom I have not the smallest Pretensions to be compared, have confessed, that
they

they have committed the greatest Mistakes every Campaign, and have retired sometimes when they ought to have fought; and at other Times fought when they ought to have retired, neglecting sometimes the most essential Precautions, both in good and bad Fortune. However, I have not the Merit of seeing my own Faults; for I am not sensible that I committed any, during the Time I had the Command. And I must say, that if I had the Honour again to be appointed to the same Command, if such a Thing could be, even with my past Experience, I would take every Step that I have taken, and not change my Conduct in the smallest Respect.

For my Part, when I considered the Difficulties of acting with Vigour upon the Coast of *France*, with the Number of Troops under my Command, greatly diminished from what they were upon the late Expedition; I was very sorry that his Majesty was obliged to have recourse to me, and to desire me to ac-

E

cept

cept of a Command, which had been refused by so many General Officers.

I was sent for from *Ireland*, to command the Troops going to *Germany*; and upon my Arrival, was surpris'd to find that Command was given to those who had declined going any more upon such Expeditions, after having made a Trial of the Nature of that Service.

I intended then to resign my Commissions, which I thought I could no longer keep with Honour.

But being press'd very much to accept the Command of the Troops going upon the Expedition, I thought it my Duty not to decline it; and that his Majesty should not be deprived at least of my honest Endeavours, tho' I saw the uncertainty of the Event. The People in *France* being already alarmed, the only Place fixed upon in my Instructions already threatened, I had reason to think that they would be more prepared, which
I found

I found to be the Case: At the same Time that the Number of our Troops were diminished about one Third, there being a great many Sick in the *Isle of Wight*, and three of our best Battalions sent to *Germany*.

Even in the most favourable Situation, if one half of the Expeditions which depend upon so many Circumstances succeed, it must be owing to extraordinary good Fortune, or extraordinary Courage and Capacity; and the Public must be a great Gainer, and have great Reason to be satisfied in such a Case. Expeditions ought to be considered as Attempts, and Troops sent upon such a Service as a Detachment; the whole of which may perish at a particular Time with propriety, and to the Satisfaction of every good Man; because upon one Hand a considerable Advantage may arise to the State, and upon the other Hand, putting Things at the worst, by their Death the State is put to no Danger. However, nobody can blame Commanders in Chief,

for having different Opinions, as to particular Conjunctions, upon so delicate a Subject.

The Superiority of our Navy allowing us to make continual Efforts, our Enemy's must be ruined in the Course of a War.

When Vigour and military Capacity are the same in different Enterprizes, yet a great deal must depend on good Fortune; tho' there is no other Way of pleasing the Mob but by Success; yet Men of Sense and People in Power ought to judge in a different Manner; if not out of Humanity and Regard for the General, at least upon Account of the Interest of their Country. Whenever it is otherwise, it must arise either from the Views of particular Connections, and from little Motives of Envy and Jealousy, or from a violent Spirit of Faction, with a Design to clog the Springs of Government, and bring ruin and destruction upon the State.

If we had landed at *Cherbourg*, opposite to the Enemy's Entrenchments, and betwixt their Forts, which was thought necessary by the People here and the People in *France*, and what the Weather only had hindered the Duke of *Marlborough* and Lord *George Sackville* from attempting; the Enterprize would have failed, and the Scene would have been bloody, for the Troops of the first Landing,

In the Engagement of the Rear Guard at *St. Cas*, the Numbers of the killed and wounded of the Enemy, were by far greater than the Numbers of our killed, wounded, and drowned.

Even if Prisoners were included, the whole is inferior, by the most probable Conjectures from their own Accounts, to the Numbers of their killed and wounded.

If the *French* thought it proper to attack our Army when it decamped, and
was

was going out of the Country ; the only View could be in making it suffer more than themselves.

What Reason therefore the *French* have to sing *Te Deum*, more than the *English*, is more than I can comprehend ; or why Colonel *Griffin*, who commanded the Rear Guard, should be deprived of what is due to him, much more than to the Duke *d'Aiguillon*, who is certainly not entitled to the smallest Degree of Praise.

Though the smallest Loss, or even a single Man being wounded, is to be deplored in peaceable Times, in the View of Humanity ; though, independent of War, the Loss of a single Man, or even a single Man being wounded, must move the human Heart ; yet, if in the Operations of War, People are capable of shedding Tears upon Account of the Effusion of Blood, and when this proceeds not from a Violence of Affection, but a depraved Feebleness of Soul, to what a horrible

horrible State are we arrived? The Horror of the Thought makes me silent!

I must proceed, and finish what I begun. If the Success of a Rear-Guard can be called a Victory, we are certainly intitled to one. So when the *French* sung *Te Deum* upon Account of this Affair, it was, with great Propriety, joined along with the *Russian* Victory. But what has happened upon it in our own Country, must remain a lasting Monument, and most admirable Picture of the Times, when almost every Man of Consideration thought it his own private Interest, from various Views and Motives, to co-operate more or less with our Enemies, in sinking and depressing the Spirit of the State.

It would be no difficult Matter to explain this in a clear Light, and adapt it to the meanest Capacity.

But whoever considers my Instructions, without Prejudice; my Want of Information,

ation, the State of the Weather, and every other Circumstance; and, at the same Time, my Zeal to execute every Intention of my Superiors; when, greatly above the Stile of the present Times, I might have returned, after cruizing along the Coast, without landing a second Time; having happily finished the Affair of *Cherbourg*, the only particular Point prescribed; will think, I am apt to believe, that I have more Merit from the second Expedition, than from the first.

As for many Reflections I have heard, which proceed from a Want of Judgment and Experience in War, it would be ridiculous in me to answer and refute.

To clear up Difficulties in such a Case, one must enter into the whole Nature of War; and, by this Means, in pulling down one Difficulty, I must, of Course, raise twenty more; so that the Struggle would become more absurd, than that of *Hercules* with the Giant of old; who, as often as he was thrown to the Ground, rose again with

with redoubled Force. The only Method, therefore, would be to crush them and their Difficulties to Pieces.

But my L—d L——er, an Officer of great Experience, is of Opinion, that with my Army I might have fought the Enemy, or any Troops that could be brought against us; and for that Reason, in particular, my Conduct is blamed.

I make no more Reflections upon the Subject. The World must Judge. Every Man has his own Opinion. I may be in the Wrong.

However, I am pleased, because I have succeeded beyond my Expectations, beyond the Apprehensions of the People in *France*, and, I'm afraid, contrary to the Hopes of many People at Home, with whom my Crime is, that I have done too much, not too little.

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-When I look over, in my Mind, every Expedition which has gone to the Coast of *France*, I think that I deserve, though People are commonly bad Judges in their own Case, the greatest Approbation and Reward.

Yet my L—d L——er had Orders to acquaint my L—d *Falc—b—ge*, Lord of the Bed-chamber in Waiting, not to present me to his Majesty, if I came to Court.

I submit chearfully to the Opinion of my Superiors; but since this has been their Sentiments, I do not chuse to have Power or Lucrative Employments upon such Terms, but leave them to those who deserve their Approbation more than I have done. Some can possess them upon any Terms; I am not of that Number.

I am convinced, that this must give great Pleasure to many; for it brings People more to a Level and Equality, which is always the ardent Desire of base, envious, jealous, little Minds.

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Though I am satisfied, that I end my Career in the Manner I have done ; yet I cannot help being sorry for my Country, upon Account of the Effects, I believe, this must have upon young Men of Spirit, Abilities, and Lovers of Military Glory, who, with a noble Emulation, desire to distinguish themselves in the Service of their Country. The Number is few ; I am afraid the Number will be less.

Yet I do not rest my Mind long upon this Thought, for Kingdoms and States must have their old Age, as well as myself.

I cannot finish this Letter, the last Letter I shall ever probably write to any Man in Power, without returning you Thanks for the many Civilities I have received.

I must beg the Favour of you, to mention to his Majesty, my sincere Gratitude, for all the Favours he formerly

merly bestowed upon me, and for his having expressed his favourable Opinion of me upon many Occasions, much beyond what I think I deserved. I only wish that my Services to his Majesty and my Country had been greater in Return than they have been.

I have the Honour to be with the greatest Respect and Esteem,

S I R,

Your most Obedient,

and most humble Servant,

T—— B.

P. S. Since I wrote the above, I had a Letter from my L—d L——r, in which he says, that he took the Liberty to mention to his Majesty my uneasy Situation, and that if I came to Court I should be presented to him.

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This was a great Favour to a disgraced Man, and whose Character, as a military Man, had suffered upon that Account.

But both my L—d L——'s Letter, in which he mentions my uneasy Situation, and Reception from his Majesty, so different from his usual gracious Manner towards me, have made me feel my Situation more disagreeable than before, and have determined me still more in my former Opinion, that I cannot keep my Commissions with Honour.

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This was a great service to a dis-
served Man, and whose Character was
illustrious Man, had laboured upon this
account.

But both my Lord and I, which he mentions my nearly situa-
on, and Reception from his Majesty, is
different from his illustrious Man-
towards me; have made me feel my
position more disagreeable than before,
I have determined and still more in
former Opinion, that I cannot keep
Commotions with Honour.



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